Delegates: Have more tokens delegated to them, and vote those so they get the delegate payments

• wants more tokens delegated hence they build their reputation for good choices but making good choices on all the proposals is too hard.
• To get paid hence they give feedback to proposals but they’re time poor and spread thin
  • To know they’re doing a good job, but they encounter the pain of highly ambiguous results

Personas

• Responsible governor - krystof from l2beat, AVE in scroll, want to be diligent, want good outcomes. Won’t propose (often not allowed because of regulations), but will be devil’s advocate. Often represent large holders, or are very senior (less time on their hands)

  • Often will talk backchannel
  • Will vote late and have a big impact
  • Getting frustrated with Service Providers

• Service Provider - delegate and also doing work. Will work on a proposal that benefits them. They want more influence with the other delegates, so they get more proposals passed

  • wants the small thing that they can tackle successfully

• Bureaucrat farmer - just wants to get paid

• Activist Delegate - low power, but trying to prove themselves. Seen as a career opportunity (building reputation). More time on their hands and more motivated. Alex Lumley, JuanRah. Maybe DonPepe.

  • Only ones that don’t have a short term conflict of interest
  • Doing far more work than they are paid for
  • Not trusted because they can’t tell if they are a grifter, or a random guy. Why are they doing this work without getting paid.
  • Sense that this work will open opportunities for them (but they are often more

• Investors (usually don’t vote)

  • time poor
  • regulations about voting and being involved (VCs who can’t operate)

Foundation Operators want DAO to run smoothly:

• Retain high quality delegates — hence they try to dynamically reward delegates based on a contribution criteria, but they encounter the PAIN of legitimacy, time effectiveness, credible neutrality, and effectiveness of the awards (which manifests as endless discussions and paralysis or putting one’s neck on the line)
• Ensure no one group captures the DAO,
• Ensure the DAO doesn’t makes bad choices
• Retain their governance position, so they try to demonstrate the impact their proposals have had on token price, but they encounter the PAIN of attribution being quite hard (and markets volatile and lion-share of price action driven by external factors)